The Middle East has long been an area of strategic importance to the United States.
Today, with the United States and the world economies relying on the free flow of oil from this part of the world, America remains engaged and committed to promoting peace, stability, and security in the region. While these are elusive goals in an area historically known for strife and war, they are attainable as evidenced by the success of various diplomatic and peace agreements that have endured to change the face of conflict in the area in the past twenty years. Indeed, since the end of the second Gulf War in 1991 and the follow on peace conference in Madrid, the momentum for peace in the region is encouraging. 
In terms of peace agreements in the Middle

United States Interests in the Middle East
What exactly are the United States interests in the Middle East and why are they important? First, the United States is engaged in promoting peace and stability throughout the world with a commitment to stable international order and basic human rights for all people. In a region of the world where so few democratic institutions exist, and conflict has become a way of life for some, the leadership of the United States will be crucial to fostering democratic processes and challenging the abuses of human rights. 2 To assist in establishing a stable and peaceful environment, an enduring and comprehensive peace between Israel and its neighbors is a cornerstone for United States foreign policy.
Second, and some would argue most importantly, the United States is committed to ensuring the "free flow of oil (from the Middle East) at reasonable prices" to protect both the United States' and the world economies. 3 The Middle East contains approximately two thirds of the world's proven and probable reserves of oil and is, therefore, critical to the health of the world economies. Any conflict in the region threatens the unencumbered access to this vital energy source and makes the promotion of peace and stability all the more important. Threats to energy supplies by Iran, Iraq, and Libya and on-going tensions between Syria, the Palestinians, and Israel all serve to destabilize and undermine the world economies and threaten access to the region's oil supplies.
Finally, America is committed to the security and well being of the state of Israel. The United States' role as a mediator in this process helped to form the framework principles for the Camp David Accords and was essential in implementing the final agreements.
Clearly, President Carter's personal involvement was indispensable to the final signing of an agreement between the two countries. 12 His personal involvement in the talks lent focus to the objective of a formal peace agreement, provided the credibility of Unites States resolve in supporting the accords, and forced both parties to approach these talks with the serious resolve and commitment necessary for establishing peace in the region. Ultimately, the United States' role in implementing the final agreement would require substantial American diplomatic, economic, and military commitments.
United States Economic and Military Commitments to the Camp David Accords
The Camp David Accords included the basic text of the final agreement, three annexes dealing with security arrangements, maps, and seven interpretive notes attached to the basic documents. Other separate letters were sent between Sadat, Begin, and Carter concerning the negotiations on the West Bank and Gaza. 13 Within these documents, the United States committed itself economically and militarily to the support of the peace agreement. expenses. As a result of this commitment, the American presence in the region provides both
Israel and Egypt with an added measure of confidence in the United States' resolve and commitment to the agreements, and provides a critical stabilizing force in the peace process.
The Camp David Accords: A Model for the Syrian-Israeli Dispute
Much as the Egyptians and the Israelis struggled for peace, the Syrians and Israelis are also trying to reconcile differences to bring about peace between their two countries. The process and results will be no less complicated or deliberate than that of the Camp David
Accords. The key issues of the Camp David Accords, the return of land acquired by war, military and economic security and stability for the two countries, and a comprehensive peace that addresses third party interests are also the key issues involved in ending this conflict. Since the issues are substantively the same between Israel and Syria as they were between Israel and Egypt, the principles that laid the foundation of the Camp David Accords provide a logical starting point for addressing this problem.
The five principles that established the foundation of the Camp David Accords could be modified as follows to apply to the Syrian and Israeli problem; 1) pursuit of a comprehensive peace for Israel, Syria, and Lebanon 2) reliance on United Nations Resolutions 242 and 338 as the basis for negotiations, 3) establishment of normal diplomatic relations between the two countries, 4) defining a Syrian and Israeli border and establishing a phased withdrawal schedule, and 5) addressing the issue of all displaced people as a result of the war and peace between Israel and Syria. 20 Of these principles, the return of land acquired by war, is central to the issue of negotiations between the two countries and settlement of this dispute.
Syria: The Land Issue
In addressing the question of the return of the Golan to Syria, the salient issues of the five Debate on Israel's capability to return the Golan and maintain its security requirements is still passionately discussed both in Israel and abroad. Clear evidence of Israel's understanding of the requirement to negotiate the return of the Golan can be found in statements by former Prime
Minister, Yitzhaq Rabin, who said, "I believe the public wants peace, and whoever says that we can reach peace while preserving the entire Golan Heights or most of it is simply lying." him. This proposal contained six principal points that formed the basis for Israeli security concerns in the Golan. These concerns are: 1) early warning stations, 2) a demilitarized zone, 3) phased withdrawal, 4) foreign peace keeping forces, 5) water rights, and 6) a timeline for establishing normal peaceful relations between the two countries. Phased withdrawal, foreign peace keeping forces, and a timeline for establishing normal peaceful relations between the two countries are more closely related to the mechanics of the implementation of a peace agreement.
The remaining three, early warning, demilitarization and water rights, are significant security issues for one or both parties. 
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The concern by the Israelis for demilitarization of the Golan stems from the fact that Syria permanently deploys approximately fifty percent of its standing ground forces (five to six divisions) between Damascus and the Golan. Israel stations only one reinforced division in the Golan and relies on the advantages of the defensive terrain and the ability to mobilize several reserve divisions in the event of hostilities. 27 The loss of the defensive positions in the Golan without some agreement for demilitarization would offer Syria a significant military advantage in placing a larger force in a dominant tactical position.
The presence of an armor heavy Israeli force in the Golan with an offensive doctrine that emphasizes preemption is also threatening from the Syrian perspective. Syria is concerned not only with Israel's ability to launch an attack that could quickly reach its capital, but with other security concerns with Iraq and Turkey. Additionally, the Syrian military is a strong pillar of support in the Assad regime that he will be unlikely to weaken. Demilitarization will be an issue that will not be solved by the reduction of forces on each side, but will be decided on where those forces are physically stationed in Syria and Israel.
The issue of water rights is also pertinent to security concerns. The management and sharing of the water sources in the Golan directly affects significant portion of the water needs of Politically, the United States will need to remain engaged in the implementation of the agreement with the end state being the normalization of relationships between the two countries.
The United States will necessarily need to strengthen its ties to both Syria and Israel as well as help the two countries build their own relationships and foster an environment of cooperation and trust. This will be no small task. The psychological mind set of the people of two countries so long in a state of war will require much effort to overcome their reluctance to work and live together in peace. The process of normalization will be lengthy, but necessary to ensure a lasting peace. In order to avoid a "cold peace" like the one that developed after the Egyptian-Israeli peace agreement, the United States should closely monitor the economic and diplomatic activities between the two countries applying political and economic incentives to ensure progress in this area. 32 The economic aspect of the peace will provide a "carrot and a stick" to both parties for carrying out the letter and the spirit of the terms of the peace agreement. Israel has already benefited significantly from this program over the years. As a result of Jordan's peace agreement with Israel, the Clinton Administration is requesting a $12 million debt reduction in fiscal year 1998. 34 Both Israel and Syria could expect to benefit from this program as they move toward expanded economic cooperation and economic revitalization of the region.
In addition to the direct and indirect influence the United States has on economic aspects of implementing a peace agreement, the United States also has the ability to influence the security of these countries through the Foreign Military Financing 
Conclusions
The United States retains a strong interest in peace in the region and possesses the ability to influence the process. Peace with Israel and its neighbors is essential to enhancing regional stability and promoting a peaceful global environment conducive to free trade and regional The talks are currently stalled over commitments previously made by the Rabin government on the return of the Golan heights. During these talks, the Syrian Ambassador Walid al-Moualem, with the American negotiating team present, understood the Rabin government to commit to the full withdrawal from the Golan Heights. 37 Comprehensive security measures still need to be negotiated for both sides concerning the conditions of the withdrawal, but the Syrians believe the Netanyahu government has backed away from this previous agreement. In order for both sides to resume meaningful negotiations, the United States must facilitate returning to this point of departure, the return of Golan to Syria. It is the sole nonnegotiable condition of the Syrians and is founded on United Nations Resolutions 242 and 338.
The United States should vigorously pursue the peace process along the model that was established by the Camp David Accords and with the idea that a committed effort by the President will be required to lead the process to closure. Once an agreement is reached, the United States should provide the political, economic, and military support necessary to ensure its success and longevity. Careful application of United States resources focused specifically on the normalization of relations and the mutual security of Israel and Syria will be critical to the long term success of such an agreement.
Finally, America's sons and daughters, in both the Armed Forces and in civilian agencies, who will be committed to monitoring and implementing the terms of a peace agreement in this volatile area must not be put at unnecessary risk. The preconditions for their safety and success must be established prior to their commitment and closely monitored for changes in the environment that might jeopardize their safety. A long term end state that sets the conditions for the complete normalization of relations between Israel and Syria and removes United States forces from the region should be the goal of United States foreign policy on this issue.
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